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The	informational	value	of	the	EU’s	Early	Warning
System
The	EU’s	Early	Warning	System,	best	known	for	the	‘yellow	cards’	that	can	be	issued	by
national	parliaments	to	EU	legislative	proposals,	has	been	the	subject	of	considerable
debate	since	it	was	introduced	by	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon.	Drawing	on	a	new	study,	Philippe
van	Gruisen	and	Martijn	Huysmans	demonstrate	the	informational	value	of	the	system
for	policymakers	and	the	general	public.
The	EU’s	Early	Warning	System	allows	national	parliaments	to	submit	reasoned	opinions	to	the	European
Commission	if	they	believe	a	legislative	proposal	is	not	in	line	with	the	principle	of	subsidiarity.	In	reality,
parliaments	also	send	these	opinions	if	they	simply	dislike	a	proposal.	If	enough	parliaments	send	such	an	opinion,
the	Commission	receives	a	‘yellow	card’	and	needs	to	reconsider	its	proposal.
The	main	criticism	of	the	system	is	twofold.	First,	only	three	yellow	cards	have	been	materialised	since	its
introduction	in	2010.	Second,	two	of	these	yellow	cards	were	simply	ignored	by	the	Commission.	The	only	time	the
Commission	withdrew	its	proposal	was	on	the	2012	Monti	II	proposal.	However,	the	Commission	explicitly	stated
that	the	proposal	was	not	withdrawn	because	of	a	subsidiarity	breach,	but	because	it	was	‘unlikely	to	gather	the
necessary	political	support’.	This	suggests	that	the	Commission	used	these	opinions	to	anticipate	failure	of	the
proposal	in	the	Council.	By	doing	so,	it	arguably	saved	precious	time	and	resources	being	spent	on	a	proposal	that
was	unlikely	to	pass	anyway.
Anticipating	failure	in	the	Council
In	a	recent	study,	we	examine	the	informational	value	of	opinions	by	parliaments	for	the	Commission	more	broadly.
We	present	a	theory	and	a	model	that	explain	why	the	Commission	withdraws	some	proposals,	as	it	did	under	the
Monti	II	regulation,	while	it	does	not	withdraw	others.
The	model	has	simple	ingredients:	the	Commission	has	a	prior	belief	about	how	much	contestation	a	proposal	is
likely	to	trigger	in	the	Council.	Under	the	Early	Warning	System,	the	Commission	can	update	this	prior	belief	by
observing	reasoned	opinions	sent	by	parliaments,	if	any.	Whether	or	not	these	parliamentary	opinions	then	provide
the	Commission	with	more	information	crucially	depends	on	the	correlation	of	the	opinions	with	the	votes	by
government	representatives	in	the	Council.
To	empirically	test	the	model,	we	matched	the	governments’	formal	votes	and	policy	statements	with	those	of	their
parliaments	for	all	proposals	introduced	by	the	Commission	between	January	2010	and	December	2013.	We	found
that	governments	are,	on	average,	five	times	more	likely	to	oppose	the	Commission’s	proposal	if	the	government’s
parliament	has	submitted	a	reasoned	opinion.	It	is	important	to	stress	that	this	effect	merely	constitutes	a	lower
bound	because	there	is	no	information	available	on	failed	proposals.	Calibrating	the	parameters	of	our	theoretical
model	on	the	data,	we	simulated	the	Commission’s	posterior	belief	that	the	proposal	will	receive	the	required
majority	in	the	Council,	as	shown	below.
Figure	1:	Posterior	probability	of	policy	passing		as	a	function	of		reasoned	opinions,	for	different	decision
thresholds
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Note:	The	calibrated	model	illustrates	how	the	Commission	may	update	its	belief	on	observing	number	of	reasoned	opinions.	The
curves	reflect	different	majority	thresholds.	QM:	qualified	majority;	ROs:	reasoned	opinions;	UN:	unanimity.	For	more	information
see	the	authors’	accompanying	study.
The	red	curve	shows	how	likely	the	proposal	is	to	receive	unanimous	support	by	the	governments,	conditional	on
the	number	of	reasoned	opinions	submitted	by	national	parliaments.	Clearly,	the	more	opinions,	the	less	the
Commission	believes	that	its	proposal	will	get	approved.	The	model	also	depicts	simulations	for	a	qualified	majority
decision	rule.	Since	the	de	facto	majority	requirement	is	much	higher	than	the	de	jure	one,	we	simulated	various
QMV	thresholds.	The	green	line,	for	instance,	shows	the	Commission’s	belief	of	adoption	with	a	90	percent	majority
rule.
The	Commission’s	decision	to	withdraw	a	proposal
Now	we	are	able	to	regress	the	Commission’s	decision	to	withdraw	its	proposal	on	its	posterior	belief,	controlling	for
a	number	of	other	important	determinants.	We	find	the	Commission	is	more	likely	to	withdraw	if	it	anticipates	more
opposition,	that	is,	if	the	posterior	probability	of	passing	is	low,	as	shown	in	Figure	2.	Moreover,	the	Commission	is
less	likely	to	withdraw	proposals	of	high	salience	and	that	have	low	costs	of	garnering	the	necessary	majority.
Hence,	the	model	can	also	explain	why	the	Commission	sometimes	withdraws	proposals	that	receive	few	reasoned
opinions,	while	it	does	not	withdraw	others	that	triggered	a	yellow	card,	as	the	posted	workers	directive
demonstrated.
Figure	2:	The	likelihood	of	withdrawal	as	a	function	of	the	Commission’s	posterior	belief
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Note:	For	more	information	see	the	authors’	accompanying	study.
Conclusion	and	implications
Our	results	have	a	number	of	implications	for	EU	policymaking	and	the	much-contested	Early	Warning	System.
First,	the	Early	Warning	System	has	important	informational	value.	Policymaking	is	arguably	costly	for	the
Commission.	Think	about	time	and	resources	spent	in	monitoring	Council	negotiations,	the	opportunity	cost	of
working	on	other	legislative	issues,	or	potential	time	spent	on	monitoring	implementation	afterwards.	As	such,	the
Commission	benefits	from	extra	information	if	this	may	lead	to	the	conservation	of	scarce	resources	and	precious
negotiating	time.
Second,	while	we	have	stressed	the	informational	value	for	the	Commission,	it	has	implications	for	a	variety	of	other
actors	that	have	an	interest	in	EU	policy.	Whether	it	be	other	EU	institutions	such	as	the	European	Parliament,	or
policymakers,	interest	groups	and	voters	more	broadly.	For	instance,	like	the	Commission,	interest	groups	can
assess	how	likely	it	is	that	a	proposal	will	pass,	and	organise	their	lobbying	activities	accordingly.	Similarly,
reasoned	opinions	may	allow	voters	to	infer	the	position	of	their	governments	in	Council	negotiations.
Third,	these	results	are	important	for	research	on	decision-making	in	the	Council	of	the	EU.	The	Council	is	still	an
opaque	institution.	Member	state	governments	are	well-known	to	hide	their	policy	preferences	for	a	variety	of
reasons.	Reasoned	opinions	from	national	parliaments	can	then	provide	an	alternative	source	of	information	for
scholars	who	have	made	it	their	primary	objective	to	unravel	parts	of	this	black	box.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	article	at	European	Union	Politics
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Doha	Stadium	Plus	Qatar	(CC	BY	2.0)
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